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Abstract 
This thesis explores the impacts of implementing the Basel Accords on the 
stability of the banking sector and greater economy, and will particularly focus on Basel 
II. This study contrasts three Latin American governments that have implemented the 
Basel Accords. Because Chile’s and Brazil’s banking sectors have been more successful 
in implementing the Basel Accords, they will be used as model cases to provide the 
context to analyze Argentina’s banking sector. The results of this thesis reveal that in 
order for Argentina to stabilize its banking sector and become a stronger international 
financial player, it must not only improve the implementation of the Basel Accords, but 
also simultaneously address discrepancies in political agendas and its banking structure.  
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Introduction 
Latin America has experienced twenty-eight systemic banking crises between 
1970 and 2007 (Laeven and Valencia 2008, 54).1 Crises result in increased non-
performing loans, exhausted capital, reduced asset prices, slowdown of capital flows, and 
other factors that affect the stability of a country’s economy. An increase in cross-border 
economic activity and the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis has displayed that economic 
globalization has surpassed the development of adequate global institutions to help 
manage globalization and advancing financial instruments (Stiglitz 2010, 151). With 
countries’ economies becoming increasingly interdependent, banking systems of 
countries should adhere to a standard that limit the risks of financial transactions and 
stabilize the global banking sector, such as the Basel Accords. By improving banking 
regulations on an international and uniform framework, such as that defined by the Basel 
Accords, the financial sectors of individual countries and global markets can be stabilized 
and more conducive to safer international financial transactions. Argentina is a prime 
example of a country with the potential to stabilize its banking sector and become a 
stronger international financial player by improving their implementation of the Basel 
Accords, if it simultaneously addresses discrepancies in political agendas and its banking 
structure.  
The effects of a banking crisis are contagious beyond a country’s borders because 
economies have become increasingly globalized and interdependent, exemplified by the 
                                                             
1 The International Monetary Fund defines a systemic banking crisis as when a country’s 
corporate and financial sector experience defaults and financial institutions have 
difficulty repaying contracts. 
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late 1980s and early 1990s when there were a substantial expansion of the global capital 
markets. The collapse of the Soviet Union and a general shift to more democratic and 
market-oriented policies increased the attractiveness of lending and investing in emerging 
market countries as well as the desire for their governments to attract foreign equity 
capital. Despite changes in how governments financed their debt and the expansion of 
global capital markets, Latin American countries underwent the crises of the 1990s due to 
a combination of unsustainable current account deficits, excessive short-term foreign 
debts, and weak domestic banking systems (Feldstein 2003, 2). 
There have been three detrimental episodes of financial crises that have 
threatened the stability of the international financial sector – the Latin America debt 
crises of the 1980s; Mexican Peso crisis in 1994; and the economic crisis in Brazil in 
1999. There were inadequacies in the regulations that had left the financial systems 
within the region vulnerable. Participation of developing countries is essential for the 
sound establishment of global and regional public goods, such as financial stability. Such 
agendas can only be realized if developing countries and emerging economies are 
involved in the global decision-making process (Stiglitz 2010, 132). An international and 
unified approach to regulation not only allows for more efficient interactions between 
financial conglomerates, but it also fosters competitive neutrality on the international 
level (Mohan, Nitsure, and Joseph 2005, 22). 
The ability of a country to withstand financial and banking crises as well as 
simultaneously promote economic growth is in part founded in the banking sector 
stability, which in turn depends on sound banking regulations. In order for society to 
benefit from a stable banking sector, the banking structure needs to be set up so that there 
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are separate entities to promote checks and balances. A stable banking sector provides the 
foundation for safe savings, inflation stability and greater access to international markets, 
which are components of economic growth and improved standard of living. There is a 
significant positive correlation between the size of a financial system and the real gross 
domestic product per capita of a country. More so, there is evidence demonstrating that 
finance promotes growth (Mohan, Nitsure, and Joseph 2005, 34). Economic growth is 
thus unlikely to occur unless financial assets are protected in addition to a secure and 
internationally reputable banking sector. The Basel Accords, a set of proposed guidelines 
to stabilize the international banking industries, provides governments standardized 
banking measurements to not only become more competitive in international markets but 
also to stabilize their financial markets and promote economic growth. 
The soundness of domestic financial systems plays a vital role not only for local 
depositors but for foreign creditors and investors as well. If depositors believe that there 
is an increase in bad loans and investments, the liabilities of the domestic banks will 
exceed the real value of their assets. As a result, depositors will withdraw funds and 
precipitate a banking crisis. Although the potential risk can be mediated by a 
government’s deposit insurance, complete dependency on the deposit insurance can 
encourage riskier lending by banks (Feldstein 2003, 8). A systematic collapse can also 
potentially eclipse the capacity of the deposit insurance fund to cover all of the deposits. 
Crisis management policies as well as the formulation of policies regarding private-sector 
participation involve institutions such as the Bank for International Settlements and the 
central banks of the Group of Ten countries (G-10) – Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, newest member Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
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Kingdom, and the United States. These are the countries that led the Basel Accord 
formation.   
The Argentine economy exemplifies the perverse impact that an undisciplined 
banking sector can have in undermining economic stability. Brazil and Chile are 
countries with higher domestic credit shares as a percentage of gross domestic products 
compared to other Latin American countries. Argentina, on the other hand presents 
domestic credit, provided by the banking sector, at levels lower than 40 percent of its 
GDP (BIS 16). In order for the Argentine government to provide the conditions 
conducive to economic growth, as exemplified by Brazil and Chile, there are factors 
outside the financial sector that need to fall into place. Argentina has been faced with 
consecutive crises as well as changes in political ideologies that slow the advancement of 
monetary policies and the Basel Accords. By looking at Basel Accord implementation 
strategies of the Chilean and Brazilian governments, Argentine policymakers can tackle 
factors that hinder the execution of the Basel Accords. 
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Basel Accords 
The Basel Capital Accords, reforms for improved crisis prevention, are a 
proposed set of guidelines to prevent financial institutions from taking on unsound risks 
in lending too much capital by establishing minimum reserve requirements. The “New 
Accord” uses the term “banking group” to encompass “groups that engage predominately 
in banking activities, and in some countries, a banking group may be registered as a 
bank” (BIS 5, 1). It features a capital measurement system to define a standard risk 
measurement determining the minimum capital standards intended to promote stability in 
the international banking system (BIS 9). By regulating risk and reserve requirements, the 
Basel Accords are enabling governments with the ability to participate in global financial 
transactions. The Basel Committee was originally comprised of the G-10 countries. There 
are currently twenty-seven members of the Basel Committee. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 
are the only countries from Latin America. Other countries on the Basel Committee 
include countries such as Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, and other global players in 
addition to the original G10 countries (BIS 14). 
Moral hazard within financial institutions occurs, in part, when banks use their 
equity capital in risky investments in an attempt to increase their return on equity. By 
regulating the minimum amount of capital a bank is required to hold, the potential for 
moral hazard and bank failures is reduced. The Basel Accords attempt to minimize this 
risk by addressing and redefining several banking mechanisms, including capital 
adequacy ratios. “Tier 1” capital only applies to disclosed cash reserves and capital 
accumulated by the sale of the bank’s equity or shareholders’ equity. “Tier 2” capital 
includes, but is not limited to, reserves of hybrid debt/equity holdings or gains from bank 
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stock sales (Balin 2008, 3). “Tier 3” capital, eventually abolished in Basel III, is 
subordinated debt that cannot be repaid before maturity, and with an original maturity of 
at least two years (Shearman & Sterling LLP 2011, 4). Under the Basel Accord, bank 
assets are grouped into categories based on their degree of risk, which are then used to 
calculate a bank’s risk-adjusted assets. A bank’s capital adequacy is calculated using its 
capital relative to its risk-adjusted assets. Capital adequacy is defined as the ratio of Tier 
1 capital relative to its risk-adjusted assets plus the bank’s total capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 
2) relative to risk-adjusted assets. The capital ratio would be Tier 1 capital relative to its 
risk-adjusted assets.  
2 
Reserves = .08*Risk Weighted Assets + operational risk reserves +market risk reserves3 
 
The higher a bank’s capital ratio, the lower its leverage and the better it is able to 
withstand short-term losses. Although the Basel Accords do not directly dictate the 
multiple of risk-adjusted assets at which an institution can lend, the capital ratio 
                                                             
2 Ferguson, “Capital Standards for Banks: The Evolving Basel Accord,” 397. 
3Balin, “Basel I, Basel II, and Emerging Markets: A Nontechnical Analysis,” 11. 
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requirements limit the value of assets commercial banks can acquire relative to their 
capital. By implementing capital and risk requirements, banks with low capital ratios are 
forced to either close or to raise additional capital, increasing the stability of the 
commercial banking system (Hubbard and O’Brien 2012, 370). 
Basel I 
International Convergence of Capital Measurements and Capital Standards, also 
known as Basel I, was initiated by the United States’ apprehension that American 
financial entities were being displaced by Japanese competitors, which was partially 
attributed to their lack of capital adequacy regulation allowing them greater leverage 
(Vanoli 2007, 3).The high degree of leverage used in investments magnifies the size of 
any return, since the financial institutions or investors are using borrowed money in the 
investment (Hubbard and O’Brien 2012, 232). Internationally active banks were 
relocating to countries with weaker bank regulations allowing the international banking 
sector to be more susceptible to a crisis, as demonstrated by the banking crisis in the 
1980s. As a result of the banking crisis, there was a desire among the large international 
banks and G-10 economies to formulate a common banking standard (Balin 2008, 2). In 
1988, G-10 central banks came together to form the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, via the Bank for International Settlements, to create the Basel Capital 
Accord, also known as Basel I. Therefore Basel I was intended to be implemented by 
developed markets, such as those in G-10 countries. The objectives of the Basel Capital 
Accords are to “promote the soundness and stability of the international banking system 
and to provide an equitable basis for international competition among banks” (Ferguson 
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2003, 396). The framework is intended to allow national supervisors the liberty of 
adopting the standards specific to their markets and institutions. The original framework 
assessed capital in relation to credit risk and addressed the other risks implicitly, placing 
all regulatory capital requirements on measures of capital risk.  
The Basel I Accord is divided into four pillars. The first is the Constituents of 
Capital, which defines what types of on-hand capital constitute the bank’s reserves and 
how much each type of reserve a bank should hold. In order to satisfy the Basel Accords, 
financial institutions had to hold the same quantity of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital (Balin 
2008, 3). The second pillar addresses risk weighting, dividing risk into five categories. 
The risk reserve ratio is applied to a weighted sum of assets, which take into account the 
degrees of risk for each type of asset. The five risk categories cover all assets on a bank’s 
balance sheet. Risks are weighted as 0 percent, 10 percent, 20 percent, 50 percent, 100 
percent, or within a variable category. Assets categorized as 0 percent, riskless, are 
defined as the cash held by the bank. The 50 percent moderate risk only included 
residential mortgages. The highest risk assets, 100 percent, include the bank’s assets in 
the private sector, Eurobonds or dollar-dominated debt, and equity (Balin 2008, 3). The 
risk classification allows banks to take on the riskiest asset within each category. Just as 
financial institutions can manipulate the way they meet capital, they can also manipulate 
the risk so that they can maximize revenue within a given risk requirement ratio. Banks 
with the highest-yielding financial instruments and innovations are then given an 
advantage in their ability to continue pursing risky assets (BIS 3, 3). 
The third pillar, a target standard ratio, is a combination of the first and second 
pillars by setting a standard of “8% of a bank’s risk-weighted assets must be covered by 
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Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital reserves” (Balin 2008, 3). The fourth pillar of Basel I loosely 
addresses implementation of the three other pillars. Each country is recommended to 
create a self-surveillance and enforcement mechanisms. All Basel Committee members 
were able to implement the Basel I Accords by 1992.  
Basel I was criticized by some policymakers and analysts in both developed and 
emerging markets for being too simple. Basel I gives banks excessive leeway in the 
interpretation of the recommended regulations, as it specifies only five levels of risk in a 
banking sector that varies greatly in credit options. This allows for capital ratios to be 
“uninformative and provide misleading information about a bank’s capital adequacy 
relative to its risk” (Ferguson 2003, 396). For the developed economies, the simplified 
risk framework also allows for banks to easily “game” the system, avoiding capital 
requirements. Because the standards are not law, banks are able to pick which 
requirements they meet and in reality participate in riskier loans and assets.  
The Basel Committee was accused of not taking into account that the creation of 
the international banking standards would have a strong influence on the emerging 
market economies. These critics also assert that Basel I’s implementation is misapplied 
because of the “high degree of regulatory leeway, view of domestic currency and debt as 
the most reliable and favorable of asset instruments, and perception of FDIC-style 
depositor insurance” (Balin 2008, 5). The relaxed regulation and the FDIC-style 
insurance expectation caused emerging markets to underestimate the credit default risks 
of a bank’s assets. As a result, many banks were taking on excessive risk and the central 
banks did not have sufficient capital to bail out the whole sector (Balin 2008, 5). Basel I 
also encouraged international investors to move from holding long-run emerging market 
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bank debt to holding short-run non-OECD bank debt; according to Basel I risk-weight 
measurements of bank debt, short-run debt is weighted at a lower riskiness. Therefore, 
the focus on short-term investments caused more volatile emerging market currency 
fluctuations. Furthermore, because emerging market sovereign debt was perceived as less 
risky than private debt, the private sector was removed from many lending portfolios. 
Since most of the debt was being held by the government, effects of recessions were 
exacerbated and the costs of potential sovereign default were amplified.   
Over time, the Basel Accord eventually broadened its framework “to measure 
capital adequacy and a minimum standard to be achieved by international banks in 
adopting countries” (Ferguson 2003, 396). Rather than just regulate risk, which limits 
banking functions, the Basel Committee revised its framework to include how a bank 
calculates its capital.  
Basel II 
Compared to 1988, the banking sectors around the world had experienced greater 
globalization and formation of new financial instruments since the creation of Basel I. As 
a result, the changes in the financial structure needed to be addressed by revised banking 
regulations. To reflect the changes in structures and practices of financial and banking 
markets over time, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision drafted A Revised 
Framework on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards, informally known as Basel II, in 1999. The focus of Basel II has been to 
strengthen the regulatory capital framework for international banking organizations via 
capital requirements that reinforce incentives for strong risk management (Ferguson 
2003, 397). The goal of Basel II is to provide new and more sensitive approaches to 
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measuring credit risk, thus the difference between Basel I and Basel II involve 
application of the risk assessment methodologies. The focus of the Basel II framework 
can be divided into three pillars.  
Pillar I bears a lot of weight in defining risk and in addressing the minimum 
capital requirements regarding the measurement of financial institutions’ assets, changing 
the definition of risk-weighted assets and the methods used to measure the risk (Ferguson 
2003, 398). One of the main differences between Basel I and Basel II is the calculation of 
risk exposure, which is dependent on the bank’s credit, market, and operational risks. The 
first pillar broadens the definition of risk to include assets of the holding company of an 
international bank; thus, the first pillar addresses the issue of banks transferring their 
assets to other subsidiaries to hide risk-taking.  The two approaches in measuring credit 
risk are either the “Standardized Approach” or the “Internal Ratings Based Approach” 
(IRB). The “Standardized Approach” utilizes market-based rating institutions. It 
combines corporate debt with bank debt, further eliminating loopholes (Balin 2008, 8). 
Rather than contract an outside credit rating agency, the “Internal Ratings Based 
Approach” encourages banks to create their own self-surveillance systems and provides 
them with a sense of autonomy. The IRB approach uses banks’ internal ratings to map 
default probabilities using a particular formula defined by the Basel Committee. Banks 
are then able to use this approach to determine capital requirements as a function of the 
default probability and other factors (Majnoni, Miller, and Powell 2004, 1). 
The Basel Committee encourages the IRB approach by forcing banks to increase 
their risk-weighted reserves an additional 6% if they use the Standardized Approach. In 
other words, the IRB approach allows for lower reserve requirements, enticing the banks 
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to take a greater variety of customers as well as achieve higher profitability (Balin 2008, 
8).The autonomy and tailoring of risk weights practiced using the IRB approach is 
intended to promote more capital flow into the private sector because the public debt is 
not necessarily the most trusted. The flow of capital into the private sector “increases the 
depth of the banking sector in a country’s economy, and in sum, encourages economic 
growth,” according to Bryan Balin of The Johns Hopkins University (Balin 2008, 8). 
Furthermore, meeting conditions set by the Basel Committee and determining their own 
risk probabilities, institutions can manipulate, and lower, the figure that goes into 
calculating their reserve requirement. Thus, by having lower risk-weighted asset 
calculations, they can hold fewer reserves. Although this may seem counter to the Basel 
Accord objective, the IRB approach caters to institutions that have already used the 
standardized approach and are equipped to use their own resources to independently 
assess risk. The fact that the banks can conduct their own assessment and management of 
risk independent of government aid is another intention of Basel. 
The first pillar also reassesses operational risk, protecting against it either via the 
“Basic Indicator Approach,” “Standardized Approach,” or “Advanced Measurement 
Approach.” The “Basic Indicator Approach” recommends that banks hold “capital equal 
to fifteen percent of their average gross income earned in the past three years” (Balin 
2008, 9). If using the “Basic Indicator Approach,” regulators have the ability to change 
the percentage according to their risk assessment of each bank.  In both the “Standardized 
Approach” and “Advanced Measurement Approach,” regulators have the final approval 
for revisions of reserve calculations. With regulators deciding how much capital a bank 
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should hold, they have a substantial amount of authority in determining a bank’s risk 
weights.  
The reevaluation of market risk makes the distinction between fixed income and 
other financial products such as equity, commodity, and foreign exchange vehicles, 
which are all susceptible to inflation. The “Advanced Measurement Approach” enables 
banks to calculate their own reserves needed to protect against interest rate and volatility 
risk, factors that contribute to fixed income assets and market stability (Balin 2008, 9). 
For other types of market risk, the Basel II Accords use a variety of methodologies, from 
dividing assets by features, allocating risk weights based on the country’s markets, or 
encouraging the bank to assess their market risk on a case-by-case basis (Balin 2008, 11). 
Only consisting of forty pages of the three-hundred-fifty pages, the second and 
third pillars are not as thoroughly expanded upon compared to Pillar I (Balin 2008, 11). 
The second pillar concentrates on supervisory oversight, focusing on the bank-regulator 
relationship. The Basel II Accords authorize regulators to perform comprehensive 
assessments on whether banks have sufficient capital to support their own risk profile as 
well as provide constructive feedback to bank management on internal assessments 
(Ferguson 2003, 398). Principles established within Pillar II involve supervisors 
examining banks’ strategies and expecting the banks to operate over the regulatory 
minimum capital (Vanoli 2007, 20).The institution’s supervisors evaluate the internal 
capital adequacy, which involves confirming that target levels of capital are met, properly 
monitored, and appropriate for the institution’s business (Basel Committee 2006, 210). 
The third pillar addresses transparency by requiring banks to disclose information 
to market participants to assess an individual bank’s risk profile (Ferguson 2003, 398). 
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The idea is that banks with lower risk profiles and transparent markets attract investors 
and promote financial stability. By recommending that banks provide quarterly releases 
of their risk-taking and risk-prevention actions, the Basel Accords attempt to enforce 
discipline on the banks by empowering the shareholders in risk processes (Balin 2008, 
12). 
Basel III 
Basel III was introduced in December 2010 to address weaknesses in Basel II, 
with implementation beginning in 2017 to allow banks a transition period. The 
framework calls for better-quality capital, more exhaustive risk coverage, and the 
introduction of a leverage ratio as the foundation of the risk-based requirement (BIS 11). 
The Basel Committee will be using the transition period to determine whether the 
revisions are appropriate for the full credit cycle and other business models (BIS 11). It 
includes a more restrictive definition of Tier 1 capital and “bottom of the cycle” 
standardization for Pillar I regulatory capital requirements. Revisions to Pillar I’s capital 
regulations include a clause that allows, with the approval of the country’s banking 
authority, the conversion of assets to common shares if the bank is non-viable. This 
increases the involvement of the private sector in the case of potential future crises, thus 
reducing moral hazard (BIS 11). 
Two new main components are the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio (NSFR).  The Liquidity Coverage Ratio requires banks to have sufficient 
high-quality liquid assets to withstand a 30-day stressed funding scenario that is 
determined by the financial institutions’ supervisors (BIS 11). The NSFR is a longer-term 
structural ratio to promote more medium and long-term funding of the institutions’ assets. 
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It covers the entire balance sheet and creates incentives for banks to use more stable 
sources of funding. NSFR is the amount of available stable funding to the amount of 
required stable funding; the ratio must be greater than 100 percent. Stable funding is the 
type of equity and liability financing that is expected to be reliable under periods of 
extended stress (BIS 11, 25). An example of stable funding includes a bank’s total 
preferred stock with maturity greater than one year (BIS 11, 26). If banks are below the 
minimum ratios and requirements, they can lengthen the term of their funding or 
restructure their business models which are most vulnerable to liquidity risk.  
Criticisms against Basel 
Although enhancing bank stability is one of the principal objectives of imposing 
the Basel Accords and its risk-based capital requirements, the evidence of the direct 
impact of the Basel Accords has been mixed. Looking at fifty countries, critics have 
found weak results that minimum capital requirements are positively related to the 
banking sector’s stability. Furthermore, Latin America displays greater sensitivity of loan 
growth compared to other countries implementing Basel due to past losses in equity.5 
Critics argue there is a modest positive correlation between minimum capital 
requirements and stability – associated with lower probability of crisis (Barajas, Chami, 
and Cosimano 2005, 5). Critics speculate that despite increased sensitivity to capital 
ratios, banks are not necessarily becoming more sensitive to factors such as credit risk 
because it has only indirect impacts on the value of bank assets. On the other hand, there 
has also been evidence that loan growth in Latin America has become more sensitive to 
                                                             
5Loan growth is the rate at which financial institutions provide borrowers with loans. A 
rapid loan growth could be due to the easy credit standards, whereas slow loan growth 
could be caused by an unstable market. 
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risk factors, as expected from risk reducing behaviors of banks subjected to increased 
regulatory scrutiny (Barajas, Chami, and Casimano 2005, 7). However, critics are 
concerned that the increased sensitivity to loan growth, which may inhibit lending, may 
counteract the intentions of the Accords of fostering a financial environment conducive to 
sound banking transactions. A negative effect of increased financial development is that 
banks can artificially reduce their risk-weighted assets due to advanced financial 
instruments available or take advantage of poor enforcement of regulations (Barajas, 
Chami, and Casimano 2005, 22). As a result, they may end up superficially increasing 
their loan portfolio in order to satisfy the Basel Accord regulations (Barajas, Chami, and 
Casimano 2005, 22). 
Although banks may receive more favorable ratings from the international rating 
agencies when they comply with the Basel Accords, the credibility of credit ratings as 
indicators of bank risk has diminished. In fact, it has been proposed that stronger 
compliance with the principles relating to improved supervision is actually associated 
with riskier banks (Demiriguc-Kunt&Detragiache 2010, 5). Joseph Stiglitz’s criticisms of 
Basel go farther to include the potential discrimination against developing countries. 
Inadequate representation in the Basel Committee causes Basel’s analysis and 
recommendations to appear incomplete and bias in various aspects. This causes a 
challenge for global acceptance of the recommended standards and in implementation by 
the non-inclusive countries, usually less financially advanced (Stiglitz 2010, 137). Stiglitz 
proposes that a more inclusive and appropriate representation in the Banks for 
International Settlements would allow for not only a fairer system but also in better-
implemented regulation, and thus a more stable global financial system. The notion of the 
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banking system being self-regulated within each country is viewed as problematic. Stigliz 
proposes that standard-setting activities should actually be reported to an international 
governmental body (Stiglitz 2010, 139). 
Critics are concerned that Basel II may also cause credit to become more 
procyclical as loan supply becomes more sensitive to risk factors that fluctuate with 
business cycles (Barajas, Chami, and Casimano 2005, 22). Therefore, there may be poor 
assessment of Basel compliance since recorded laws and regulations may vary or not be 
reflective of the true state of the financial institutions of the country. Critics concluded 
that there has been no significant change in the sensitivity of loan growth to the 
nonperforming loan ratio. Additionally, it has been argued that the effect of Basel on 
Latin American countries does not depend on the individual country’s financial 
development (Barajas, Chami, and Casimano 2005, 21). 
Counter argument: 
Addressing the greater sensitivity to loan growth, there have already been three 
generations of the Basel Accords and 88 of 107 non-G10 countries have implemented 
them (Marshall 2005, 4). So although we may not be able to currently quantify the effect 
of the Basel Accords on bank stability in the short run, the creation of Basel has brought 
international attention to the negative effects of different banking standards. The power 
of collective action brings legitimacy to the intended impacts of the Basel Accords.   
The positive impacts of the Basel Accords can be indirect. By opening up the 
conversation to include non-G10 countries, the international banking sector forms a 
unified front to work towards a common set of standards. Financial institutions are likely 
to invest and conduct transactions where Basel Accords are being implemented since it is 
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assumed that investors can more easily circulate their capital. Furthermore, using a multi-
country bank analysis, critics found that after implementing the Basel regulations, Latin 
American banks in fact increased their capital and size of loan portfolios. As a result, 
banks held a capital-asset ratio 4 percent more than the world average, and a loan ratio 
that was 1 percent over the world average (Barajas, Chami, and Casimano 2005, 21). 
Therefore, the credibility of the Basel Accords needs to be evaluated in the long term, 
and not on an annual or short-term basis.  
 Parallels have been made between the impacts of the Basel Accords and of the 
Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus was criticized for too much 
contraction and applying general policies to countries where the policies may not be 
beneficial. The difference between the Washington Consensus and the Basel Accords lies 
in the legalities of implementation. The Basel Accords provide a variety of methods to 
calculate risk and capital. There have also been three generations of the Accords to 
address banking instrument advances and to further improve on the previous Accord.   
Basel Accords in Latin America 
The Basel Committee cannot legally impose implementation of the banking 
standards. However, their implementation by all G-10 countries as well as 95 countries 
outside the G-10 places pressure on emerging markets to implement the regulations 
(Balin 2008, 13). The implementation of the Basel Accords is seen by investment banks 
as a reflection of regulatory strength and financial stability, thus the governments of 
emerging markets implement the regulations in attempts to attract investments and 
receive cheaper financing. On average, Latin America’s bank capitalization and lending 
activities have increased after the implementation of Basel, having a positive effect on the 
23 
 
international markets (Barajas, Chami, and Cosimano 2005, 1). Emerging markets banks’ 
ability to comply with Basel II also has significant implications not only for financial 
systems within the country, but also for the rest of the international community because 
of the increasing interconnectedness of the financial and banking sectors.  
Latin American countries have a strong incentive to implement the Basel 
Accords. By 2015, approximately 77% of banking assets in non-G10 countries are 
expected to be subject to Basel II regulations (Marshall 2005, 6). Not only would it 
contribute to the banking and financial sector stability, but many international financial 
institutions used the adoption of Basel I as a condition for their assistance (Vanoli 2007, 
4).  With each new generation of the Basel Accords, discovered loopholes are addressed 
and regulations are improved.  
Basel Accords in Developing Countries 
The Basel Committee, with input from non- G10 authorities, the IMF, and World 
Bank, published the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision in 1997 and a 
revised version in 2006. The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision is not 
only a methodology but also benchmarks for developing countries to assess the quality of 
their supervisory systems and identify areas that need improvements (BIS 8).With greater 
input than Basel I and Basel II, the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
was directed to non-G10 countries that require an additional framework to outline the 
minimum standards to effectively implement the Basel Accords. The Core Principles 
were addressing challenges that non-G10 countries, especially developing countries, 
faced that were distinct of their emerging markets and comparatively underdeveloped 
banking sectors. 
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Even before implementation of the twenty-five core principles, the Basel 
Committee describes preconditions in The Core Principles that must be established to 
solidify the foundation for the Basel Accords. The first external factor necessary for 
implementation of the principles and the Basel Accords is stable macroeconomic policies, 
which is beyond the banking supervisors’ and regulators’ jurisdiction. The second 
precondition mentioned is a “well developed public infrastructure” (BIS 8). The Basel 
Committee defines a well-developed “public infrastructure” as including a system of 
business laws addressing corporations, bankruptcies, contracts, and property laws. It also 
calls for well-defined accounting principles, an auditing system, and secure procedures 
settlements of financial transactions (BIS 8). “Market discipline” is another necessary 
precondition for the core principles and Basel Accords. Market discipline refers to 
various aspects of financial markets such as the following: the liquidity of markets; 
prevention of investor insulation from consequences of the markets; and bank action 
transparency (BIS 8). Regarding market discipline, governments should also not be able 
to override commercial decisions to pursue political objectives. When creating policies 
for an effective market, the regulators and supervisors must obtain legitimate power and 
have sufficient resources to implement risk management processes. The final 
precondition mentioned involves mechanisms for providing “systemic protection” 
determined by the government and the central bank, as it involves public funds; that is a 
public safety net such as deposit insurance. “Systemic protection” must be designed to 
limit moral hazard and contribute to public confidence in the banking system (BIS 8). 
Regulators should be involved since they are knowledgeable about the risk and 
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preventative actions taken by banks. For many countries, the systemic protection is in the 
form of deposit insurance (BIS 8). 
The aforementioned core principles are intended to address weaknesses in the 
environment of banking systems that threaten not only the implementation of the Basel 
Accords but also financial stability both domestically and internationally. According to 
the Basel Committee, the twenty-five core principles are considered “universally 
applicable” and “are needed for a supervisory system to be effective” (BIS 8). They 
address elements such as transparency, powers of supervisors, and methods of banking 
supervision – domestically and internationally. A common theme found in the core 
principles is the need for supervisors and bank management to want to implement the 
Basel Accords and be able to exert their authority. Without the regulators and bank 
authorities willing to implement the principles and create the supervisory infrastructure, 
the Accords will not be effectively implemented. The regulators are the determinants of 
banks’ abilities for self-surveillance and ethical standards. The supervisors must also be 
provided “an adequate range of supervisory tools” to prevent financial services abuses 
and enforcement of risk management policies (BIS 8). 
Basel II in Latin American Countries 
The Basel Accords raised the standard for banking regulations to strengthen 
global capital and liquidity regulations with the final goal of promoting a more resilient 
global banking sector (BIS 9). However, poor implementation of Basel I and Basel II 
could create a false sense of security in an emerging economy’s financial sector, which 
could promote banks to undergo new, but less obvious risk (Balin 2008, 2). The Basel 
Accords goal is for banks to provide adequate capital to guard against risk. Neither Basel 
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I nor Basel II mandate policies addressing the risks and challenges faced by Latin 
American countries, which are different than the challenges faced by developed 
countries. For example, Latin American markets are more susceptible to fluctuations in 
national currency, artificially manipulated interest rates, and changes in macroeconomic 
downturns (Balin 2008, 2). Latin American governments have had a different reaction to 
the Basel Accords than of developed countries since they confront different obstacles, 
have different economies and cultures.  Recurrent problems in developing countries’ 
implementation include, but are not limited to, credit risk under-estimation, under-
estimation of capital requirements, accounting rules not aligned with international 
standards, and regulatory infrastructure (Marshal 2005, 11). 
Although Basel II addressed the problems in Basel I, the detailed 
recommendations of banking regulations caused emerging markets to struggle with Basel 
implementation. For instance, in Pillar I’s promotion of self-surveillance, the Basel 
Committee intended to decrease the cost of regulation for banks. However, emerging 
markets may not have the human capital or power to enforce regulations for self-
surveillance. Developing countries have the challenge of implementing not only the 
infrastructure for self-surveillance but also the honesty of regulators. By giving banks and 
regulators the autonomy to define their own risk assessment and calculations of reserve 
requirements, the Basel recommendations are easier to implement in developed market 
economies than in emerging markets, which are often faced with political instability, 
corruption, and lack of human capital for the banking sector.  
Supervisory independence, resources, and legitimacy are additional challenges for 
developing countries when implementing the Basel Accords. Basel II’s comprehensive 
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approach to risk is easier for the bigger and developed banking institutions to implement 
because they are able to afford not only the costs of implementation but also the highly-
skilled human capital. The regulators and supervisors need to be capable of implementing 
the regulations and developing the appropriate risk assessments and requirements. The 
lack of highly skilled employees to regulate risk actions, whether by government 
regulators or self-surveillance agencies, causes regulations to be more relaxed in 
developing countries. As a result, banks can be more likely to engage in riskier actions, 
which inhibit investors and capital inflow. Supervisors and regulators tend to have fewer 
resources than in developed countries in terms of human capital, information systems and 
technology infrastructure, as well as legal and real power (Majnoni2005, 128).  
Another challenge for emerging market financial institutions to implement Basel 
II is their inability to hire internationally recognized rating agencies to assess their debt. 
Typically, only the larger firms can afford to hire outside rating agencies, such as 
Moody’s, S&P, or Fitch. Firms in developing markets, on the other hand, would prefer to 
self-regulate to be more cost-effective. However, global banks may then be less likely to 
loan to emerging market banks because such loans would require larger capital reserve 
requirements to be held by the lender compared to loans made to larger, recognizably 
rated banks(Balin 2008, 14). Furthermore, if smaller banks cannot afford the services of 
the larger rating agencies, they are more likely to lose diversification of the types of loans 
issued because creditors will not want to lend to them. In addition to their inability to 
diversify their loan portfolio, small borrowers would also be more exposed to sectoral 
shocks (Balin 2008, 15). Compared with world averages, Latin American and Caribbean 
banks appear to have similar capitalization and profitability, but higher interest margins 
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and overhead costs. Therefore, they tend to concentrate most of their activities in lending, 
and thus less in liquid assets. This may cause Latin America to seemingly have a less 
competitive or less efficient banking system (Barajas, Chami and Cosimano 2005, 12). 
Politics and Basel 
There are politics within every institution, whether within the political parties, the 
Central Bank, or financial institutions. However, policymakers set the foundation that 
either inhibits or prevents the financial institutions to implement effective policies. 
Political conflict can be expected regarding any policy initiative, including the Basel 
Accords whose committee is mostly comprised of developed countries. Emerging market 
governments implement the Accords not only for bank security but also because a 
functioning and efficient banking system attracts capital flow to all sectors of an 
economy. When banks are politically or legally limited from expanding their businesses, 
establishing new branches, or improving their products, the optimal distribution and 
allocation of capital is compromised (Sousa 2009, 493). For elected officials to preserve 
their popularity, economies must be stable as well as allow banks to yield returns and 
provide loans. Furthermore, the protection of consumers, both depositors and investors, 
stimulate the economy because people are more likely to participate in the trade and 
consumption, and thus, stimulate economic growth. The Basel Accords provide 
policymakers an opportunity to implement regulations that appeal to international banks 
and institutions, making their economy more enticing to foreign investments. 
Additionally, implementation of the Basel Accords can help governments prevent 
liquidity crises. If a liquidity crisis arises, it can cause a recession, and debt downgrades, 
reducing the global reputation of the country as a recipient of investment.  
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Despite the fact that government policymakers have incentives to discipline the 
banking sector, political volatility and corruption often hinder the implementation of the 
Basel Accords. Policymakers are often under pressure to provide short-term solutions, 
which may have worse consequences in the long term. Furthermore, there is often 
conflict among policymakers who have different terms. Those with shorter terms are 
more pressured to short-term solutions compared to long-term positions, such as the 
president of the central bank, whose position insulates him from risk of dismissal. There 
is also the concept that banks want to be able to lend abundantly and borrowers want to 
borrow abundantly, which is counter to the Basel objectives. The benefits of 
implementing Basel are long term and difficult to assess within the term of an elected 
policymaker. 
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Model Cases: Chile and Brazil 
Chile 
The only Latin American economy whose debt issues received an AA rating, 
Chile’s financial sector complies with more than 80 percent of the Basel Committee’s 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, which is greater than any other Latin 
American countries (SBIF 2005, 3). 
Chile’s advantage stems from the lessons learned during the collapse of its 
banking system in the 1980s. In response to the crisis, the Chilean government introduced 
banking legislation in 1986 that implemented strict regulatory and supervisory controls. 
Chilean reforms included implementation of a new risk-based supervisory model and 
convergence of domestic accounting rules with international standards (Marshal 2005, 
26). Chile’s policymakers were able to implement several relevant reforms including 
macroeconomic variables, such as fiscal deficit and inflation being kept under control. In 
addition, the government created incentives to substitute equity capital for debt capital. 
Regulatory frameworks for banks were also revised after the 1982 crisis to address 
weakness in the banking sector (Barandiaran 1999, 5). The 1986 reforms laid the 
foundation for Chile’s well-capitalized banking system. After the government revised the 
financial sector, Chile’s economy was able to avoid the effects of the financial turmoil 
during 1995 and 1997-1998 in other emerging market economies (Corbo 2005, 3). With 
technological and financial instrument advancements, Chile’s banking regulations 
adapted to the evolving industry by allowing for greater flexibility. By 1997, Chile’s 
policymakers also reformed its legal framework to correct the strictness in order to 
provide for new areas of business to both national and international banks. In 1999, the 
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Chilean Central Bank underwent an external evaluation of its implementation of Basel I 
and revealed a 76 percent level of compliance. By 2004, Chile’s compliance increased to 
83 percent (Marshal 2005, 27). In fact, bank regulators revised a Basel I rule to address 
weaknesses in capital charges for market risks.  In 2005, the Chilean central bank 
replaced the market-risk rules, which were based on asset and liability mismatches, with 
regulations that would provide a more direct and clear assessment of market risk based on 
risk assessment and capital allocation (Marshal 2005, 10). By revising and editing the 
Basel I regulations to optimize the banking sector and assessment, Chile’s banking sector 
was prepared to implement Basel II only two years after all G-10 countries implemented 
the Accords. The Chilean government implemented Basel II in 2008, whereas 
Argentina’s government is expected to implement the Accords in 2013 (Balin 2008, 13). 
Chile’s multifaceted platform explains why Chile’s banking sector was in a good 
position for Basel II. Chile’s policymakers had prepared its financial institutions such that 
they were already aligned for the Basel II Accords. Independent of Basel implementation 
initiatives, Chile’s bank regulators had introduced a new model of bank supervision that 
focuses on the quality of a bank’s risk management policies, instead of monitoring risk 
levels. The Chilean model concentrated on credit risk, market risk, and operational risk, 
which is very similar to the second Basel II pillar. At the end of 2003, the Chilean 
government also launched an initiative that intended to align the banking industry’s 
accounting practices with the internationally accepted principles. Similar to Basel II’s 
third pillar, disclosure requirements of banks were increased, which improved market 
discipline and transparency (Latin Finance 2004, 4). In January 2004, Chile’s 
policymakers also launched a new credit risk classification and provisioning system. The 
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revised system established ten categories for the classification of debtors, with different 
risk profiles. Although banks were able to have their own strategies for assigning 
borrowers to each category, using Basel II categories for risk was mandatory for all banks 
(Latin Finance 2004, 4).  
Another of Chile’s principal advantages in transitioning to the Basel framework 
was its practical approach to the capital adequacy requirements. For example, small 
banks with a capital base of less than $20 million were required to fulfill a minimum 
capital ratio of 10 percent of risk-weighted assets. In Chile, having a 10 percent minimum 
has become the market standard for institutional investors due to the original requirement 
(Latin Finance 2004, 4). The gradual approach to revising its banking sector also 
reflected an understanding of the banking sector’s need for transition time. By finding the 
optimal speed of execution, Chilean policymakers were able to maximize the benefits of 
implementing the Basel Accords while minimizing the costs. Since the Chilean economy 
did not have market pressure to rush its compliance with Basel II, implementing Basel II 
should actually reduce the cost of capital for mainly long-term transactions for which the 
regulatory restrictions can be binding (Latin Finance 2004, 4). Since the cost of capital is 
the risk and the economic and political implications associated with risk, Basel II reduces 
the cost of capital by minimizing risk. The gradual implementation of Basel further 
allows for lower cost of capital because banks are not only more stable, but are also 
prepared to implement subtle changes to abide by the regulations. Furthermore, if banks 
officials expect that the cost of capital will decrease, they will want to lend long term 
where they can obtain more secure and higher returns. 
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Basel Accord Implementation Strategies 
In addition, Chile’s policymakers were able to systematically break down the 
transition to the Basel II Accords. They chose to use the “Standardized Approach” to 
credit-risk management since most of its banks target the domestic market. In the first 
stage, Chilean banks were exposed to and gained experience with the new modeling 
provisions, in order to prepare for future IRB approaches. Policymakers mainly focused 
on the transition to the standardized approaches to credit risks and operational risks, 
beginning in 2007. The financial sector had a two-year period for preparation between 
2005 and 2007. The period allowed for institutions to anticipate the capital effects and 
undergo the necessary staff training (SBIF 1, 16). Regulators allowed smaller banks to 
adapt more slowly to the compliance principles because they are to be subject to higher 
capital adequacy requirements than the larger international banks. Chilean policymakers 
also focused on leveling the playing field among all banks, regardless of national or 
foreign ownership, since international banks in Chile account for 40 percent of the market 
(Latin Finance 2004, 4). Once the financial institutions had established the standardized 
approach, the second stage of the Basel II implementation was to transition onto the 
internal ratings approach for the assessment of credit and operational risks (SBIF 1, 3). 
Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras Chile (SBIF) supervise Basel II 
implementation. The SBIF obtained legal authority because its status and statutes are 
defined Title I of the General Law of Banks. The SBIF focus was amended in 1997 
within the General Banking Law (LGB), stressing the consistency with the Basel 
34 
 
Committee objectives.6 For instance, to promote self-regulation, each financial institution 
must analyze on an annual basis the development of its management according to the 
SBIF standards that are equivalent to the Basel recommendations (SBIF3). 
In implementing the first pillar of the established minimum capital requirements 
and risk coverage, Chilean bank regulators turned to LGB for supervision and disclosure 
of information. Pillar I maintains the minimum eight percent capital ratio intended to 
cover potential losses of Chilean banks. LGB’s definition of capital is comparable to 
Basel’s division of capital into three tiers.7 Core capital is equivalent to Tier I capital, and 
subordinate bonds are equivalent to Tier II. Chile’s banking regulations do not define 
capital that would be applicable under Tier III. Expected losses are to be covered using 
provisions in contracts, and unexpected losses with capital available by the institution 
(SBIF 1, 3). Using the standardized approach to credit risk, provisions that can form Tier 
II capital is limited to 1.25 percent of credit risk-weighted assets. More so, bank assets 
are weighted as pre-determined asset risks based on external ratings by risk classification 
agencies (SBIF 1, 5). 
Regarding credit risk weights, Chilean regulations differs from the basic Basel II 
framework on two accounts: the case of residential mortgage loans and residential leasing 
contracts, for which Basel II establishes a weight of 35 percent and Chilean regulations 
set at 60 percent (SBIF 1, 6). Addressing market risk using the standardized approach, 
interest rates and exchanges are estimated separately, and then added together to calculate 
                                                             
6The General Banking Law establishes and provides the SBIF legal regulatory authority, 
including its responsibility for implementing the Basel Accords. 
7See Basel I Section, page 9, for the definitions of tiers of capital. 
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overall market risk, excluding consideration of financial institutions’ positions in shares 
and commodities under the LGB (SBIF 1, 10). 
Pillar II addresses financial institutions’ supervisory review process. According to 
the LGB, all banks operating in Chile must submit to the inspection and supervision 
powers of the SBIF endowed by the LGB. The LGB also looks over cases where banks 
must have a capital-risk ratio greater than eight percent. In Chile, banks with less than 
800,000 Unidades de Fomento are required to have a minimum capital ratio of ten 
percent, which rises with the less effective capital held by the institution.8 The SBIF also 
sets the framework to asses a bank’s management and solvency, which includes credit-
risk provisions, structure and allocation of capital, stress tests, internal organization, 
corporate governance, and financial transparency (SBIF 1, 14). 
Chile’s regulators implemented the third pillar that addresses transparency by 
taking into account the “information’s materiality,” whose omission could change or 
influence the assessment. A general guideline establishes that although each bank is 
responsible for defining its own policy in calculations, it must follow the SBIF 
requirements (SBIF 1, 15). 
In converting from the standardized approach to the internal-ratings based 
approach, the following criteria would cease to apply: Basel I calculation of bank capital 
requirements; a capital ratio of at least 10 percent to qualify for an A solvency rating in 
terms of credit-risk weights; and the interpretation of capital limits (SBIF 1, 20). Each 
                                                             
8Unidades de Fomento is a financial unit adjusted for inflation used to determine changes 
in price level of goods and services. For instance, it is used with bank loans, investments, 
and contracts. It is comparable to the Consumer Price Index (IndicadoresFinancieros 
2012). 
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additional requirement is introduced within the LGB, giving the implementation of the 
revised banking regulations legal power. The Chilean government is reluctant to drop 
these now because the banks still need these aspects of supervision to meet the capital 
and risk requirements.  
Brazil 
Brazilian government has made progress to improve corporate governance and 
promote financial deepening to help constrain the expansion of expenditure commitments 
and to sustain growth over the past few decades (De Mello 2011, 6).The Brazilian 
banking sector had experienced a low investment rate, which has taken its toll on public-
sector investment. A low investment rate, both from foreign and domestic investors, 
lowers the capital flow. Therefore, a low investment rate not only inhibits a government’s 
ability to expand infrastructure, but also indicates the risks and weaknesses of capital 
markets. Causes of the low investment rate included macroeconomic instability during 
the 1980s and 1990s and a lack of long term financing for private sector and fiscal 
consolidation. To address notorious hyperinflation, Brazil’s policymakers adopted 
inflation targeting (IT) after the devaluation and floating of the real in 1999. IT policies 
improved transparency of monetary policymaking. By adopting price stability policies 
simultaneously with financial regulatory policies, Brazilian policymakers have been able 
to create the foundation for sustainable growth (BIS 1, 149). 
The Real Plan in 1994 changed the way financial institutions operated, and made 
lending as the main way to generate revenue. The Real Plan emphasized the privatization 
of public enterprises, incentives to private foreign investment, and the freedom of 
movement of capital (Goncalves and Teizeira 2006, 1867). With banks unfamiliar and 
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lacking a credit culture, the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) became involved in the 
evaluation of loan portfolios.  Therefore during the late 1990s, the BCB changed its 
approach from a monitoring agenda to a regulatory approach for the banking sector. Their 
new supervisory process of Global Consolidated Inspection triggered an increase in 
demand for improved credit data. 
The Credit Risk Center was launched in 1997 to help develop the emerging credit 
information system, focused on meeting the demands of bank supervisors who needed 
better data for bank lending. The Credit Risk Center provided the data for regulators to 
better quantify a borrower’s credit risk and lending data. Launched in June 2004, the 
BCB created the Credit Information System (SCR) to replace its predecessor the Credit 
Risk Center. The updated Credit Information system’s purpose was not only to disclose 
credit information and debt levels but also to further improve the financial institutions’ 
ability to manage credit risk. The revised SCR program was able to incorporate new data 
as they arrived (Latin Finance 2004, 4). SCR’s long term goal takes into consideration 
Basel’s capital requirements insofar as the information is organized such that Basel 
indicators are easily obtained (Latin Finance 2004, 4). SCR functions as a central 
depository of all credit portfolios. The SCR process involves financial institutions 
sending their files on a monthly schedule to the Central Bank, where the data are 
validated and evaluated (Latin Finance 2004, 4). 
Due to its reforms and size of its economy, Brazil has evolved as a regional leader 
and international player in the financial markets. The Brazilian economy was able to 
withstand the financial crises in 1994, 2002, and 2008, dissimilar to other countries. 
Furthermore, its banking system was also able to expand particularly between 2000 and 
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2005 (BIS 16, 22). Brazil’s higher spread, between domestic credit provided and interest 
rates owed, implies it has a larger capital base and has set the precedent in Latin America.  
Basel Accord Implementation Strategies  
Brazil is one of two Latin American countries on the Basel Committee, giving it 
an insider advantage over other countries in the region. As a member of the Basel 
Committee, Brazil’s representatives not only can contribute to the formation of 
regulations it will eventually implement, but Brazilian policymakers can also model their 
current regulations based on the future Basel Accords. Because Brazil’s economy has 
been experiencing rapid economic growth for over two decades, it can afford to spend the 
resources and time on implementing the Basel Accords. Policymakers imposed a 2012 
deadline to implement Basel II, and it is expected to be finished in 2013 (Rumsey 2010). 
In order to stabilize Brazil’s volatile markets, the BCB has established a minimum capital 
ratio of 11 percent, and other banks have capital ratios up to 20 percent. Regardless of 
ownership, the requirements for credit, market, and operational risk were applied 
uniformly across all financial institutions in Brazil (Central Bank of Brazil 2005). 
Basel II implementation within the Central Bank of Brazil is coordinated by the 
Department of Financial System Regulation and the Department of On Site Supervision 
(Central Bank of Brazil 2005). The BCB focuses primarily on terms for implementing 
Pillar I of minimum capital requirements. However, steps to implement Pillar 2 and Pillar 
3 were expected to occur simultaneously within the same timeframe for Pillar 1 
compliance (Central Bank of Brazil 2005). Regarding credit risk assessment in Pillar I, 
the BCB was not using ratings assigned by external credit rating agencies to estimate 
capital requirements. Originally, financial institutions were required to adopt the 
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Simplified Standardized Approach to credit risk. Similar to Chile’s implementation 
framework, larger and internationally active financial institutions will have the 
opportunity to adopt the IRB approach (Central bank of Brazil 2005). “The Central Bank 
has granted to banks the discretion to implement risk management according to their risk 
sophistication,” says Marcus Manduca, partner at Pricewaterhouse Coopers in São Paulo 
(Rumsey 2010).  
The Central Bank of Brazil also intended to use the adjustments to market risk as 
an opportunity to increase capital requirements, not explicitly included in the existing 
Brazilian standards. The BCB will comply with the 1996 Amendment to the 1988 Basel 
Accord.  The 1996 Amendment allowed banks to use in-house models to measure market 
risks as an alternative to the standardized measurement framework (BIS 2). However, the 
models meet a different criteria established by the BCB (Central Bank of Brazil 2005). 
 
Schedule for Basel II Implementation in Brazil10 
As outlined in Banco Central do Brasil Communique 12,746 of December 9, 2004 
 
 
                                                             
10 Central Bank of Brazil, “Focus Report: Basel II Implementation in Brazil,” 2005. 
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Brazil’s larger banks created separate departments to validate their internal 
models. However, the challenge is to create a structure that prevents conflicts of interest 
and ensures segregation within the institution. “Some have chosen to have the risk area 
report to the internal audit committee or directly to the board and at others a chief risk 
officer has been designated,” said Manduca. “In which case departments develop their 
own models” (Rumsey 2010). Smaller sized banks have been forming validation 
departments within the internal audit area. Banks are then challenged with finding the 
human capital. According to Manduca, “Many banks are having to change the 
professional profiles as existing staff don’t have the necessary quantitative and statistical 
background to manage data” (Rumsey 2010). Data collection is also a hindrance in 
implementation since Brazil’s financial data infrastructure is dated. Although the larger 
and international banks have the resources to implement up-to-date data collection 
systems, this provides an unfair advantage to smaller banks. Smaller have to compensate 
and face additional expenses. 
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Argentina 
By the end of the 1980s, Argentina’s financial system underwent high levels of 
inflation, one of the causes of capital outflow (Vanoli 2007, 4). The hyperinflationary 
explosion in 1989 caused the collapse of fiscal policies and of Argentine international 
reserves. With the Carlos Menem administration, the Argentine government followed 
some recommendations of the Washington Consensus to convert the economy into a 
market economy, especially using monetary policy. Public sector reform involved 
privatizing almost all public enterprises; public subsidies were reduced or eliminated and 
the enterprises’ efficiencies improved (Pou 2000, 13). 
The Argentine government also implemented two benchmark developments: the 
Convertibility Law of 1991 and the Central Bank Charter of 1992. The convertibility law 
fixed the exchange rate of one Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar and required the Banco 
Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA) to back two-thirds of the monetary base with 
international reserves, limiting Argentina’s ability to manipulate money supply and 
eliminating inflationary financing of the government’s deficit. The Central Bank Charter 
made the BCRA independent of the executive and legislative branch in addition to 
allowing the BCRA to back the Argentine currency with up to one-third of dollar-
denominated Argentine securities, evaluated at market prices (Pou 2000, 14). 
After the Tequila Crisis in early 1995, the BCRA experienced an 18 percent 
decline in capital inflow, reducing the bank’s liquidity. To protect investor confidence, 
the BCRA implemented a program of mandatory private deposit insurance in April 1995. 
It also opened contingent repurchase agreements with 13 international private banks, 
providing the Argentine economy an option for short-term access to capital (Pou 2000, 
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14). Since 1995, traditional reserve requirements have been replaced by liquidity 
requirements, which is dangerous since Argentine banks have experienced reduced 
liquidity. The minimum capital requirements have remained to be the sum of 
counterparty risk, interest rate risk, and market risk for the trading portfolio (Pou 2000, 
14).  
After the crisis of the 1970s and into the 1980s and 1990s, while most Latin 
American governments financed their budget deficits in their domestic capital markets, 
the Argentine government was an exception (Feldstein 2003, 2). Argentina’s 
convertibility law pegged the peso to the dollar at a one-to-one exchange rate. Since the 
exchange rate was fixed too high, Argentina’s economy was importing more than it was 
exporting. The trade imbalance made it impossible for Argentina to pay the interest of its 
foreign debt. Therefore, the BCRA had to borrow to meet the interest payments, causing 
the debt to increase even more. As a result of the overvalued fixed exchange rates and 
excessive foreign debt, unemployment rates were close to 15 percent, and tightened 
macroeconomic policies pushed the economy into a recession (Feldstein 2002, 8). In 
addition to the direct effects of the 2000 convertibility crisis, the International Monetary 
Fund provided a $22 billion loan to the BCRA in January 2001 that exacerbated the 
effects. The IMF loan was based on the conclusion that the country was facing a liquidity 
crisis, and that any exchange rate problem or sustainability of debt could be addressed 
with increased fiscal restraints, structural reforms, and financial support (Villar 2005). 
The IMF loan further encouraged Argentine government to implement contractionary 
policies that led to three years of recession before the crisis. The IMF encouraged the 
continuation of ineffective policies by providing large loans (Feldstein 2003, 3). As a 
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result, BCRA borrowed heavily in dollars in the international markets to finance its 
government deficits (Feldstein 2003, 2).  Most of the Argentine banks had shifted 
ownership to foreign banks, primarily from the United States and Spain with which there 
is an improved management (Feldstein 2003, 9). Despite bank regulatory reforms, the 
Argentine economy underwent a recession from 1999 - 2002.  
Banking Structure & Politics 
The Argentine banking system is regulated by the relatively independent central 
bank BCRA.  The Argentine banking system had a minimal system for potential bank 
failures in which troubled banks unable to comply with regulations would automatically 
have their license removed and undergo liquidation. The BCRA is the entity that 
conducts due diligence and establishes the conditions for banks’ rehabilitation plans. The 
procedures are applied at the sole discretion of the BCRA (De La Torre 2000, 2). The 
basic system sought to minimize moral hazard, a reaction to the previous crises. By 
encouraging depositors to monitor banks’ conditions and to impose discipline by asking 
for higher interest rates when there was increased risk, banks were expected to impose 
decisions reflective of the market. However, the Convertibility Regime and the Tequila 
Crisis further limited government authorities to avoid or delay a bank’s liquidation (De 
La Torre 2000, 2). 
Prior to the crisis, the Argentine banking system was considered relatively well 
capitalized, very liquid, and well managed with forty percent of the system’s total assets 
in possession of highly rated international banks. However, despite these positive aspects 
of the banking system, it was vulnerable to three risks: government risk, credit risk 
denominated in foreign currency, and the weakening of key institutions such as the 
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BCRA (Gutierrez and Montes-Megret 2004, 1). The weakening of government financial 
institutions is displayed by the privatization of fifteen provincial banks in 1996 as well as 
the closing of Argentina’s National Bank of Development. 
The weakening of the government’s fiscal position was accelerated by the 
resignation of two finance ministers in March 2001 as well as the resignation of BCRA’s 
President in April 2001. As a result, depositors’ run on banks caused a loss of bank 
deposits of US$18 billion, approximately 20 percent of total bank deposits (Gutierrez and 
Montes-Megret 2004, 1). In addition to policymakers attempting to use their power to 
streamline their agendas, they also do not have the luxury of implementing policy that are 
good for the economy in the long run but would cause negative effects in the short term. 
Various causes of the2001 crisis include, but are not limited to, changes of Presidents and 
their economic policy ideologies as well as poor implementation of Argentine bank 
regulations.11 Neither the ruling Alianza nor Radical Party, nor their opposing Peronist 
Party, had the political will to assume the political costs of imposing the fiscal 
adjustments. It is also possible that the ruling parties were waiting for a time when there 
would be no other option but to discontinue the convertibility model (Villar 2005). 
Changes in political ideologies caused not only the financial and banking sector to be 
unstable but also the regulation objectives to be inconsistent, making investors hesitant to 
deposit their capital. The BCRA currency reserves were depleted, despite the instated 
reserve requirements. 
More recently, the problem of top government official turnover persists. There 
was political dispute regarding policies the BCRA should pursue in January 2010. 
                                                             
11 Emma McConville, conversation, October 24, 2011.   
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Argentine President Christina Fernandez de Kirchner issued a decree to transfer $6.6 
billion of the reserves to a fund to address the growing public debt. However, technically 
the Central Bank is independent and any transfers of reserves need to be authorized by 
the Argentine Congress. As BCRA Governor Martín Redrado declined to support the 
plan without Congress, President Fernandez ordered Mr. Redrado to resign. At the time, 
Redrado’s spokesperson fired by informing the media that Redrado would not sign from 
his post until the end of his term in September 2010(Doberti 2010). Eventually President 
Fernandez sought Congress’ approval and her order was signed. However, the process 
resulted in Mr. Redrado being seen as a martyr for policy by the public (Del Este 2010). 
Basel Accord Implementation Strategies 
The adoption of Basel I in Argentina by the Banco Central de la República 
Argentina coincided with the Convertibility Regime – pegging the Argentinean peso to 
the American dollar. Argentina was distinct as a developing country implementing the 
Basel Accord because its adequacy standards were more demanding than the 
requirements suggested by the international standard. The Argentinean implementation of 
Basel I required a “strict regime of provisions for expected losses, and more demanding 
because the ratio capital/risk assets turned out to be superior to the 8 percent promoted by 
the BIS” (Vanoli 2007, 5). In fact, the capital to risk ratio for Argentina was set to a 
comparatively high level of 11.5 percent in addition to the additional net worth 
requirements (Vanoli 2007, 5). After 1993 and the Tequila Crisis, the BCRA adopted 
“Basel Plus” to further improve the financial system’s adequacy and liquidity (Vanoli 
2007, 5). Although the Convertibility Regime eased the implementation of Basel I, its 
adoption did not generate a strong enough financial system to withstand the crisis in the 
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early 2000s. In fact, if the Argentine economy remained on the dollarization, the 
discrepancy between reserves and capital with international exchange rates would have 
made the continued adoption of Basel I impossible. Domestic values of assets and 
liabilities were bound to fluctuate with changes in the exchange rate. Therefore, with 
assets changing value, most likely decreasing, but their reserves remaining pegged to the 
dollar, the imbalance prevented the reserve requirement to adequately reflect the risk in 
assets and liabilities.  
According to the Bank of International Settlements, Argentina is now one of the 
most delayed Latin American countries in implementing the Basel Accords. In fact, the 
Financial Times reported in October 2011 that “Argentina had made no effort to 
implement the agreement [Basel II] at all” (Masters 2011). Announced in December 
2006, the Argentine government had determined that banks were to complete Basel II 
implementation by 2010. This was the same year that Argentine Central Bank president 
declined to support a debt diminishing plan. Argentina’s economy is also ranked the 
lowest among other large economies in Latin America, such as Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico, regarding adoption of implementation plans (Banco Central de la Republica 
Argentina 2007).  Argentina needs to revamp its financial system. The government has 
struggled to implement the Basel II Accords due to its changing political parties in 
power, apathetic attitude, and constantly changing monetary policies. 
The BCRA decided to adopt the simplified standardized approach, similar to 
Chile, thought to be in effect by January 2010. The BCRA kept in line with Basel II for 
determining market risk and interest rate risk. However, the BCRA sought alternatives 
beyond the recommendations by the Basel Committee for treating operational risk. The 
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Central Bank assumed beyond their reasonable capabilities that it would fully implement 
Pillar II and II before the minimum capital requirements of Pillar I went into effect.  
Contrasting the published documents by the BCRA and the Central Bank of 
Chile, it is apparent that the Central Bank of Chile’s twenty-seven page road map is more 
comprehensive compared to Argentina’s three-page document. Published in 2007, 
Argentina’s road map lists several thresholds, but they are neither detailed nor active. For 
example, the stages can be summarized as the following: publication of optimal practices 
for risk management, seminars, review of supervision processes, and analysis of 
calculation of capital (Banco Central de la Republica Argentina 2011). Although 
Argentina announced the adoption of the simplified standard approach in 2006, to be 
completely implemented in 2010, it had not yet announced how it would address 
operational risk in 2007 (Vanoli 2007, 26). The roadmap claimed that “given the chosen 
approach, there will not be major changes in the financial entities’ global capital 
requirement nor in the way it is calculated. Conversely, the Central Bank considers it is 
convenient to continue the analysis of the alternatives available of operational risk, in 
order to find the most suitable for the local financial system” (Banco Central de la 
República Argentina 2007).The claim that they would implement Basel, but there would 
be no change displays the apathetic approach to abiding by the Basel Accord 
recommendations.  
In 2009, Argentina planned to have the Basel capital requirements, in terms of 
credit risk, parallel with the enforced BCRA regulations. BCRA also allotted two years, 
2007 to 2009, for Pillar II to be implemented (Vanoli 2007, 25). Furthermore, BCRA 
intended to have the capital requirements correspond to the simplified standardized 
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approach. However, Argentina’s capital ratio requirements fluctuated approximately two 
percent, which is a considerably high dispersion. Therefore, there was a significant 
disparity among the different banks (Vanoli 2007, 24). 
Challenges 
Compared to the Chilean banking industry, the Argentine banking sector was not 
as prepared to implement the Basel Accords. Immediately after the collapse of the 
banking system in the 1980s, Chilean policymakers implemented strict regulatory and 
supervisory controls. Argentine policymakers, on the other hand, followed the 
recommendations of the Washington Consensus during the late 1980s and converted to a 
market economy. The rapid initiative to privatize almost all public enterprises weakened 
the direct control previously held by the Argentine government. Argentina’s government 
took the conversion to a market economy a step further by implementing the 
Convertibility Law in part to ease economic transactions as well as finance their budget 
deficits. 
The BCRA believes it is more acceptable to take its time implementing the Basel 
Accords because the Argentine banking system is still in a primitive state (Doll 2011). 
Distinguishing its banking sector from those in Brazil and the United States, Argentine 
local banks were consulted by Argentine newspaper El Conista believe that the delay in 
implementation is not worrisome since it has a less developed banking system (Doll 
2011). However, risk vulnerability and bank primitiveness are two different 
characteristics. Economics professor from the University of Buenos Aires Miguel Kiguel 
said that “while the cost of not applying this regulation still isn’t very big, today one 
notes a certain lack of appetite at the Central Bank” in adopting the Basel Accords (Doll 
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2011). Their relaxed approach to implementing Basel in addition to the most recent crises 
has provided Argentina’s policymakers the excuses for their delayed implementation of 
Basel.  
Prescriptions for Argentina 
Prior to addressing banking conditions or macroeconomic stability, the Argentine 
government needs to be stable. The changing of the political parties and the ideologies 
seen in legislation is natural, especially since Argentina is a constitutional republic and 
representative democracy. However, rather than have the conflicting parties resulting in 
the “best outcome,” the radical swings in ideologies in office have weakened the 
government’s fiscal position.  Politicians must remain cognizant that they should focus 
on long-term benefits.  
Argentina also needs to be able to withstand the impacts of macroeconomic 
instability, some of the causes of which are beyond the government’s control, without 
weakening its own economy. The Argentine government has previously addressed the 
negative effects of economic instability by imposing the Convertibility Regime, which 
proved to be unsuccessful. Brazil’s economy had also faced high inflation and 
macroeconomic instability during the late 1980s through the early 2000s. However, 
rather than turn to the international markets to satisfy its budget deficit, the Brazilian 
government adopted policies to stabilize commodity prices simultaneously with financial 
regulatory policies. The Argentine government, on the other hand, seems to have focused 
solely on its convertibility policies and other monetary policies. 
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Re: Banking Sector 
International banks in Argentina are susceptible to crisis because of their limited-
liability feature, in which they face crisis as stand-alone entities. As a result, depositors in 
emerging markets may not reap the full benefits of an international bank. However, 
limited liability also protects the international banks from the Argentine government. In 
the absence of limited-liability, the Argentine government would have an increased 
incentive to expropriate the assets of international banks, which control 53 percent of 
assets in the country. According to data collected by Salomon Smith Barney, an 
international bank controls a domestic bank if its stake in the domestic bank is at least 40 
percent (Del Negro and Kay 2002, 2). International banks also control 40 to 50 percent of 
total loans in Argentina. By strengthening the protection and presence of international 
banks, Argentina can bring their clients to the country and access a larger pool of foreign 
investors. Therefore, Argentina would attract capital inflow. 
The large presence of international banks is partially caused by enhanced 
efficiency compared to domestic banks, since foreign banks have higher competitive 
advantage. In the Latin American market, the United States and European banks have 
high profit opportunities. The presence of American and European banks in Latin 
America also allows their clients, both from abroad and within the country, to expand in 
the region. Foreign banks are also less affected by shocks that are typical in Argentina. 
Although increased foreign banks presence does increase exposure to external shocks, 
international banks’ increased portfolio diversification makes the domestic financial 
system less susceptible to domestic shocks. Furthermore, the presence of international 
banks implies that interest rates on loans for domestic firms are lower. The lower cost of 
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capital for domestic firms is due to the international banks’ diversified risk; thus, they are 
able to offer lower returns (Del Negro and Kay 2002, 8). Foreign banks tend to have 
more aggressive loan provisioning and higher loan recovery rates than domestically 
owned banks, due to their access to greater resources. Therefore, it can be implied that 
the promotion of foreign banks’ entry into Argentina can lead to a more stable banking 
system (Del Negro and Kay 2002, 9). However, domestic banks have the advantage of 
access to markets in more rural areas where the financial markets are less developed. 
Although some domestic banks may be wiped out due to the increasing presence of 
international banks in the market, domestic banks are able to offer higher returns since it 
undergoes riskier loans.  The BCRA does require banks to contribute monthly to a state 
run deposit insurance and bank liquidity fund (Rindebro 2004).12 Therefore, both 
domestic and international banks offer the investor and borrower different products, 
satisfying the demand for both types of banks.  
Re: Basel 
Unlike Chile, Argentina faced significant market pressure to comply with Basel. 
Argentina had been experiencing a series of consecutive crises between the 1980s and 
2000s. The causes of Argentina’s inability to withstand the regional and global crises 
range from both its own policy ineptness as well as global conditions. However, by 
properly implementing the Basel Accords, the Argentine government could have 
minimized the effects on its economy, and still can.  
                                                             
12 The fund is administered by a government entity called SEDESA. SEDESA and the 
fund bank up deposits up to 30,000 pesos (US$10,000).  
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Immediately after the crisis in the 1980s, Banco Central de la Republica 
Argentina fixed its exchange rate to the U.S. dollar, backed its monetary base with 
international reserves, and eventually borrowed to meet its interest payments. These 
unwise monetary policies stalled the formation of conditions necessary for the 
implementation of Basel to be effective and well-timed. Chile’s policymakers, on the 
other hand, had tightened its banking regulations. Adapting to the modernization in the 
industry throughout the decade and into the early 2000s, the Chilean government first 
established clear guidelines, but then gave banks room to meet those guidelines. The 
restructuring of the bank regulations, independent of satisfying Basel, prepared the 
financial institutions by putting them in a good position to meet both Basel I and Basel II 
frameworks. Both public and private financial institutions were already familiar with the 
notions of capital adequacy and risk requirements. In addition to the changes in monetary 
policy that created a transition among the different kinds of monetary policy, Chilean 
policymakers also explicitly set a two-year transition period for banks to adapt the 
standardized approaches and for employees to undergo updated training. Argentina also 
allotted two years for Pillar II to be implemented. However, one of the differences 
between Chile and Argentina lay with Argentina’s capital ratio requirements 
inconsistency among banks, which fluctuated approximately two percent.  
In Chile, the Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras, a separate 
entity from the central bank, is authorized to supervise banking businesses and other 
financial institutions as well as safeguard depositors and the public interest (SBIF 2011). 
Brazilian policymakers also have implementation of the Basel Accords coordinated with 
the Department of Financial System Regulation and the Department of On Site 
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Supervision. Yet, Argentina’s central bank is the institution that is supposed to supervise 
the implementation of the Basel Accords. It is beneficial to have separate agencies for 
formulating and another for implementing the policy because it allows for checks and 
balances. If there is only one agency authorized to administer and supervise all aspects of 
the policy, there are conflicting interests that can prevent efficient distribution of the 
agency’s resources. If Argentina’s central bank is to remain responsible for the 
implementation of the Basel Accords, then it should make the recommendations become 
requirements. Looking at the roadmap for Basel II, there is no mentioning of the urgency 
of Basel implementation other than “it is expected that the process of adoption of Basel II 
be gradual until its full implementation as from 2010” (Banco Central de la Republica 
Argentina 2007). 
Aside from the limited three-page roadmap for executing Basel, the Argentine 
government did not extensively provide banks or regulators sufficient guidelines as to 
what revisions would be applied. Although it is commendable that policymakers included 
consistent involvement of supervisors of financial entities in the market via bilateral 
meetings and surveys, their involvement could equally slow the process rather than 
streamline its execution.  
Mirroring the Chilean government’s approach to implementing Basel and 
following the methodologies outlined by the Basel Committee, Argentine policymakers 
should simplify the process for financial institutions by having core capital equivalent to 
Tier I capital, and subordinate bonds equivalent to Tier II. All three countries’ 
governments have initiated the process by having the financial institutions implement the 
standardized approach. However, the Brazilian and Chilean implementation outline noted 
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that larger and foreign financial institutions would eventually have the opportunity to 
adopt the advanced IRB approach. Argentina’s implementation outline does not mention 
the IRB approach at all. In order to make implementation of the Basel Accords appealing, 
Argentina’s BCRA should accommodate the different conditions within its diverse 
banking sector. The BCRA can appeal to the larger and international institutions by 
proposing that they can implement an approach consistent with the Basel framework that 
would give them more freedom in defining reserve requirements, such as the internal 
ratings based approach. Regarding the Third Pillar of Basel II, the Argentine government 
could emulate the Brazilian government, which created the Credit Information System. 
By having a government-affiliated entity committed to disclosing credit information and 
debt levels, financial institutions have a consistent and controlled classification of credit 
portfolios and enhanced ability to manage their risk. 
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General Prescriptions Regarding Basel II 
With the benefits of implementing the Basel Accords for the financial sector, 
many non-G10 countries with international active banks pressured the implementation of 
the Basel Accords.  
Regarding capital adequacy, although regulation may not be directly linked to a 
better quality of life, the Basel Accords reduce externalities and inequalities that 
contribute to the causes of banks’ failures (Novembre 2009, 128). Since the Basel 
Accords are considered to be “soft law,”13 what matters is not its content, but the degree 
to which the regulations are being implemented (Novembre 2009, 128). 
The government must be committed to implementing the Basel Accords, and it 
should have an agency in charge of regulating the implementation and new Accords. By 
having a separate supervisory agency overlooking the implementation, the country’s 
financial institutions would have stronger incentives and pressure to implement the 
Accords within the established timeline. Releasing a statement that the country’s 
economic agencies, including central banks, want to implement Basel is not sufficient to 
implement.  
1st. Detailed gap analysis 
The objective of a detailed gap analysis is to provide an understanding of the risk 
management framework to identify actions necessary to comply with regulatory 
requirements. In particular, a government should figure out the appropriate pace to 
implement the different aspects of the Basel Accords. A government must also determine 
                                                             
13“Soft law” is defined as recommendations which countries are not legally forced to 
implement the signed agreements. 
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to what extent the agency empowered with implementation must provide support and 
guidance. For instance, in more developed countries, the implementation agency may be 
able to only provide the new regulations. However, in emerging markets, the government 
agency may need to provide training. An analysis needs to examine the following 
components of a financial institution: governance; operational procedures; human capital; 
existing compliance; and data. Within each section of analysis, an exhaustive 
examination must be done of each component. For example, a governance analysis 
includes risk strategy as well as roles and responsibilities of bank supervisors (D 2). 
2nd. Framework Development 
Each financial institution implementing Basel II chooses its own approach to 
implement the risk assessment measures. Basel provides options, such as the standardized 
approach or the internal ratings based approach. The optimal approach chosen for the 
financial institution is determined by the supervisory government agency 
recommendations and institution’s resources. However, the government agency in charge 
of implementing Basel should set an initial uniform approach to allow for uniform 
implementation among all financial institutions, regardless of size or resources. As Chile 
has demonstrated, the setting a standard approach places the financial institutions on a 
level playing field. The financial institutions need to have not only a government 
regulating agency supervising, but also have a government standard framework for 
implementing the Basel Accords.  
Framework development also takes into account the existing procedures within 
the financial institution and the banking sector culture. For instance, the banking sector 
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culture would address existing procedures within and among the institutions. A 
framework also needs to address the existing risk profiles of organizations (D 3). 
3rd. Framework implementation 
 Once the government supervisory agency has provided financial institutions a 
standard framework and timeline to implement, it is up to the financial institution to 
address deficiencies and different challenges for each institution. For instance, the level 
of organizational complexity and size will affect the institution’s resources available in 
implementing new risk approaches within the established timeline. The general path for 
framework implementation appears to initiate the process with the “standardized 
approach” with an intended gradual transition to the IRB approach.  
4th. IT tools selection 
To meet Pillar I regulatory requirements of assessing risks, banks must have a 
good data collection system in place. Creating a data collection system would also allow 
banks to calculate value-at-risk (Valladares 2006, 15). Brazil sets a good example of 
creating a government agency, the Credit Risk Center, dedicated to provide financial 
institutions with credit data, hence promoting transparency.  
5th. Pillar II/ Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment  
Improving risk management by linking regulatory capital requirements to the 
firm’s internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP), financial institutions can 
improve their ability to review their risk management system as well as advances in Pillar 
II implementation of Basel II. The eventual independence of a financial institution from 
government aid is an original objective of the Basel Accords. The formation of a 
financial institution’s ICAAP requires bank managers to understand the capital and risk 
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requirements and ratios. After necessary ongoing training, bank managers should conduct 
test stress models to prepare their institution for unforeseeable shocks (SBIF1, 13). Other 
factors such as revising internal organization, corporate governance and leadership, and 
financial transparency are all necessary for a financial institution to gain government 
approval and move onto the IRB approach. The gradual shift from the standardized 
approach to the IRB approach further advances the Basel Accord objective of having 
financial institutions not only be more stable, but also be independent of government aid 
in the case of a crisis. 
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Conclusion 
The discussion regarding stabilizing the increasingly dependent financial markets 
on an international level has been ongoing for decades, especially since the occurrences 
and effects of financial crises have become increasingly explosive. Affecting global 
markets and qualities of life, the 2007/2008 financial crisis displays how there is still 
room for improvement in implementing banking regulations with the potential to stabilize 
economies. The Basel Accords provide a solution to stabilize and uniform banking 
regulations that help banks be better prepared in future crises and manage their risk. The 
intended uniform management of risk also provides an environment for a variety of banks 
to become involved in both its domestic markets and international markets. The United 
States and the European Union set the tone for how other emerging market economies 
will implement Basel and the extent of urgency. If leading economies want greater 
banking stability, then they need to be able to fully adopt the Basel Accords to set an 
example for countries such as Argentina.  
Some Latin American countries are prime examples of successful implementation 
of the Basel Accords, and consequently have been able to attract international capital. 
The implementation period of Basel I has passed, and Basel II is suppose to be fully 
implemented by the end of 2012 (BIS 9). Several Latin American governments have 
pointed out different strategies to implement the Basel Accords. Chile’s and Brazil’s 
governments have different approaches, which have strengthened their positions as 
financial leaders in the region. Despite the fact that both the Chilean and Brazilian 
economies experienced regional and international financial crises, both economies are 
considered stable and are experiencing economic growth, in part due to participation in 
60 
 
the international financial markets. Although the short-term benefits of Basel are 
debatable, Basel Accord’s long-term benefits go beyond the improved financial 
institutions’ stability and risk assessment but also to standardize the international 
markets. 
Regarding implementation of the Basel Accords, looking specifically at Basel II, 
policymakers need to be cognizant that the implementation is not merely changing the 
capital and risk requirements. In order to successfully implement the Basel Accords, the 
political arena and other policy aspects need to be taken into account. The structure of the 
banking system, including the division of power and supervisory responsibility, must 
prevent conflict of interests. For instance, Chile’s government has two separate agencies 
to manage monetary policy and supervisory responsibility. Brazil’s government also 
contributes to the ease at which financial institutions can be transparent via its Credit 
Risk Center. Argentina, a country with the potential to successfully implement Basel II, is 
a clear example of political agendas inhibiting the implementation of the Basel Accords. 
With checks and balances preventing conflict of interest, the initiative to hasten the 
thorough implementation of Basel Accords, and long-term solutions, Argentina has the 
potential to become a more active player in the regional and global financial markets. The 
combination of political and economic policies, as well as banking system’s structure 
must create the environment to successfully implement the Basel Accords. 
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Glossary 14 
Assets, total: Include all nonfinancial and financial assets. 
Capital: Assets equal to the sum of its liabilities and equity. 
Capital adequacy ratio: The ratio of a bank’s capital to its risk.  
Capital, core:  Consists of equity capital and declared reserves. Common stock, disclosed 
reserves, non-redeemable, noncumulative preferred stock; preferably common equity, a 
category that includes common shares and retained earnings. 
Capital, regulatory: Includes several specified types of subordinated debt instruments that 
do not need to be repaid if the funds are required to maintain minimum capital levels 
(which comprise of tier 2 and tier 3). 
Capitalization: In accounting, where costs to acquire an asset are included in the price of 
the asset; a company's outstanding shares multiplied by its share price. 
Cash flow: The movement of money for the purpose of investment, trade, or business 
production. Occurs within corporations in the form of investment capital and capital 
spending on operations and research and development.  A revenue or expense stream that 
changes a cash account over a given period. Cash inflows usually arise from one of three 
activities - financing, operations or investing - although this also occurs as a result of 
donations or gifts in the case of personal finance. Cash outflows result from expenses or 
investments. This holds true for both business and personal finance. 
Competitive advantage: An advantage that a firm has over its competitors, allowing it to 
generate greater sales or margins and/or retains more customers than its competition. 
                                                             
14Definitions taken from Investopedia.com/dictionary 
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There can be many types of competitive advantages including the firm's cost structure, 
product offerings, distribution network and customer support. 
Credit risk: The risk of loss due to the failure of counterparty to meet its obligations. 
Currency convertibility: Easy which a country's currency can be converted into gold or 
another currency. When a currency is inconvertible, poses a risk and barrier to trade. 
Debt: Form of loans that must be repaid over time, usually with interest. 
Debt, bank: Any debt that is owed to a bank, by any kind of consumer, organization or 
corporation. The debt may be anything from a bank loan to a credit card debt or an 
overdraft that has been used. Often secured by the assets of the bought-out firm, this is 
the most senior claim against the cash flows of the business. As such, bank debt is repaid 
first, with its interest and principal payments taking precedence over other, junior sources 
of debt financing. 
Debt, corporate: A debt that arises from an underlying transaction between a company 
and an affiliated entity. 
Debt, subordinated: A loan (or security) that ranks below other loans (or securities) with 
regard to claims on assets or earnings.  
Equity: Form of money obtained from investors in exchange for an ownership share in 
business. I.e. stocks. 
FDIC-style depositor insurance: Since the 1930s, "resolution" is what the FDIC (Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation) does when a bank it insures fails.  FDIC bank supervisors 
determine that the bank’s assets are worth less than its liabilities. The bank itself is shut 
down and its assets are transferred to a new entity controlled by the FDIC.  This is a form 
of bankruptcy process managed by a government agency - with the responsibility to 
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manage an orderly liquidation and to avoid losses to insured retail depositors. The FDIC 
attempts to maximize the value of the assets it acquires, typically by selling them to 
another bank or banks. From the customers’ standpoint, little changes during this period: 
the branches, ATM machines, web site and so on remain in operation during the 
transition, except that customer may not be able to withdraw amounts above the 
insurance limits. If the proceeds do not cover the bank’s liabilities, the creditors lose out, 
but the FDIC makes sure that all the insured deposits are paid back. Note that going into 
conservatorship does not mean that the bank is consolidated onto the government balance 
sheet; the liabilities are not automatically guaranteed. The FDIC previously implemented 
resolution only for banks with insured retail deposits, but under the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010, the FDIC is empowered to use the same process for bank holding companies and 
other financial institutions.  It remains to be seen how this will be implemented for very 
large cross-border banks, particularly as there is no cross-border counterpart of the 
FDIC’s resolution approach. 
Fiscal balance: The balance of a government’s tax revenues, plus any proceeds from asset 
sales, minus government spending. If the balance is positive, then the government has a 
fiscal surplus, if negative a fiscal deficit.  
Fixed income: Type of investing or budgeting style for which real return rates or periodic 
income is received at regular intervals at reasonably predictable levels. Fixed-income 
budgeters and investors are often one and the same - typically retired individuals who 
rely on their investments to provide a regular, stable income stream. This demographic 
tends to invest heavily in fixed-income investments because of the reliable returns they 
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offer.  Face the risk that inflation will erode their spending power. Fixed-income 
investors receive set, regular payments that face the same inflation risk. 
Inflation targeting: Central bank policy revolving around meeting preset, publicly 
displayed targets for annual rate of inflation; benchmark used is typically price index of 
basket of consumer goods. 
Interest margin: Metric measuring how successful a firm's investment decisions 
compared to its debt situation; (investment returns - investment expenses)/ average 
earnings asset. 
Leverage: The use of borrowed money in the investment.  
Liability, limited: A type of liability that does not exceed the initial amount a person 
invested into a partnership. 
Liquidity: 1. the degree to which an asset or security can be bought or sold in the market 
without affecting the asset's price. Liquidity is characterized by a high level of trading 
activity. Assets that can be easily bought or sold are known as liquid assets. 2. The ability 
to convert an asset to cash quickly. Also known as "marketability". 
Monetary base: The total amount of a currency that is either circulated in the hands of the 
public or in the commercial bank deposits held in the central bank's reserves. This 
measure of the money supply typically only includes the most liquid currencies.  
Procyclic: Condition of positive correlation between the value of a good, a service, or an 
economic indicator and the overall state of the economy. 
Provision: A legal clause or condition contained within a contract that requires or 
prevents either one or both parties to perform a particular requirement by some specified 
time. Created to protect the interests of one or both parties name in a contract. 
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Repurchase agreement: A form of short-term borrowing for dealers in government 
securities. The dealer sells the government securities to investors, usually on an overnight 
basis, and buys them back the following day. For the party selling the security (and 
agreeing to repurchase it in the future) it is a repo; for the party on the other end of the 
transaction, (buying the security and agreeing to sell in the future) it is a reverse 
repurchase agreement. Used to raise short-term capital. 
Requirements, reserve: Requirements regarding the amount of funds that banks must hold 
in reserve against deposits made by their customers. This money must be in the bank's 
vaults or at the Fed. 
Risk weighted asset: In terms of the minimum amount of capital that is required within 
banks and other institutions, based on a percentage of the assets, weighted by risk. Based 
on the riskiness of a bank's assets. 
Risk, counterparty: The risk to each party of a contract that the counterparty will not live 
up to its contractual obligations. Because A is counterparty to B and B is counterparty to 
A both are exposed to this risk. For example if Joe agrees to lend funds to Mike up to a 
certain amount, there is an expectation that Joe will provide the cash, and Mike will pay 
those funds back. There is still the counterparty risk assumed by them both. Mike might 
default on the loan and not pay Joe back or Joe might stop providing the agreed upon 
funds. 
Risk, country: Risks associated with investing in a foreign country. Include political risk, 
exchange risk, economic risk, sovereign risk, and transfer risk, which is the risk of capital 
being locked up or frozen by government action.  
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Risk, interest rate: The risk that an investment's value will change due to a change in the 
absolute level of interest rates, in the spread between two rates, in the shape of the yield 
curve or in any other interest rate relationship. 
Risk, market: Potential for an investor to experience losses from fluctuations in securities 
prices.  
Risk, market: Risk of loss due to movements in asset prices. 
Risk, operational: Summarizes the risks a company or firm undertakes when it attempts 
to operate within a given field or industry; the risk that is NOT inherent in financial, 
systematic, or market-wide risk; the risk remaining after determining financing and 
systematic risk. Can be summarized as human risk, the risk of business operations failing 
due to human error. 
Sovereign wealth fund: Pools of money derived from a country's reserves, which are set 
aside for investment purposes that will benefit the country's economy and citizens. The 
funding for a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) comes from central bank reserves that 
accumulate as a result of budget and trade surpluses, and even from revenue generated 
from the exports of natural resources. The types of acceptable investments included in 
each SWF vary from country to country; countries with liquidity concerns limit 
investments to only very liquid public debt instruments. 
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